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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE - ABANDONMENT OF SUIT
Plaintiff and defendant had stipulated in accordance with
the provisions of article 1421 of the Code of Civil Procedure,'
that the depositions of any person might be taken at any time
or place, upon notice given in any manner, and that these deposi-
tions could be put to the same use as any others. Plaintiff, four
years after institution of the suit, finally identified, located, and
took the depositions of the defendant's engineer, fireman, and
other employees. However, there was no "formal action before
the court." At the end of the fifth year, on motion of defendant,
the trial court dismissed the suit on grounds of abandonment.
By a divided court the third circuit court of appeals affirmed;
rehearing was denied, two justices dissenting. Held, taking of
discovery depositions under stipulation of counsel without filing
formal motions in court did not constitute a step in the prosecu-
tion of suit within the five-year period sufficient to defeat a
motion for dismissal on grounds of abandonment. DeClouet v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 176 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965), writ refused, 178 So. 2d 662 (La. 1965).
Prior to 1960, article 3519 of the Civil Code, dealing with
abandonment of suit, provided that an action was abandoned
"when the plaintiff having made his demand shall at any time
before obtaining final judgment allow five years to elapse with-
out having taken any steps in the prosecution thereof."'2 The
appellate courts interpreted "a step in the prosecution" of the
case to be "formal action, before the court, intended to hasten
the suit to judgment."3 After adoption of the new Code of Civil
Procedure in 1960, the same interpretation was applied to arti-
cle 561, which had replaced article 3519 of the Civil Code.4 Thus,
the following were considered sufficient to constitute "steps in
1. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1421 (1960).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3519 (1870) has been amended by La. Acts 1960, No.
30, § 1, to remove all procedural rules. These procedural rules have been trans-
ferred to LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 561 (1960).
3. Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280 (1941) and cases cited therein;
Sanders v. Luke, 92 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; Reagor v. First Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 85 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) ; Newson v. Bailey, 88 So. 2d
391 (lMa. App. 8d Cir. 1956).
4. "An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any steps in its
prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of five years. This provision
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the prosecution or defense" :5 an assignment of case for trial
at motion of plaintiff,6 entries made in the call docket,7 a demand
in reconvention in answer to a demand in nullity s a petition by
the heirs of a deceased party to be made parties in decedent's
place ;9 a motion to advance an appealed cause to the preference
docket of the Supreme Court,10 and filing of a motion that the
court order the opponent to post bond to cover cost of trial prep-
aration." The following were considered not sufficient to con-
stitute "steps in the prosecution or defense"; an agreement to
continue the case at the request of the defendant's counsel, 12 con-
ferences and correspondence between counsel,' 3 the payment of
court costs for the transcript of evidence, 14 payment of reporter's
fee,' 5 filing of transcript of evidence,' 6 the clerk's issuance and
the sheriff's service of citations making certain persons par-
ties, 17 withdrawal of record on motion of counsel,' and resist-
ance to motions to dismiss the suit and to strike supplemental
petitions. 19
In the instant case, the plaintiff had definitely taken action
"intended to hasten the suit to judgment" though, admittedly,
shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte motion of any party or
other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal order or dismissal
as of the date of its abandonment.
. "An appeal is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecu-
tion or disposition for a period of five years; and the appellate court shall dismiss
the appeal summarily." After the adoption of the new Code, the same "formal
action" test was applied to.reach a perfectly sound result, without the appellate
court noticing that this test might not prove workable when applied to other
factual situations. Henry v. Stephens, 169 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
. 5. Note that article 561 expanded article 3519 by including "any steps in the
prosecution or defense" in the trial court within a period of five years. (Emphasis
added.)
6. Shutzman v. Dobrowolski, 191 La. 791, 186 So. 338 (1939).
7. Cocke v. Cavalier, 175 La. 151, 143 So. 33 (1932) ; James v. American
Bank & Trust Co., 175 La. 160, 143 So. 35 (1932).
8. Continental Supply Co. v. Fisher Oil Co., 156 La. 101, 100 So. 64 (1924).
9. Watt v. Ceppel, 67 So. 2d 341 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
10. Barbari v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 96 So. 2d 252 (La. App. lst Cir. 1957),
appeal transferred, 231 La. 679, 92 So. 2d 580 (1957).
11. State ez rel. Shields v. Southport Petroleum Corp., 78 So. 2d 201 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1955), appeal transferred, 230 La. 199, 88 So. 2d 25 (1956).
12. Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280 (1941).
13. Ibid.
14. Sanders v. Luke, 92 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
15. Reagor v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 85 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
16. Ibid. ; Newsom v. Bailey, 88 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
17. Seligman v. G. A. Scott & Bro., 17 La. App. 486, 134 So. 771 (2d Cir.
1931)..
18. Lips v. Royal Ins., Co. of Liverpool, England, 149 La. 359, 89 So. 213
(1921).
19. Augusta Sugar Co. v. Haley, 163 La. 814, 112 So. 731 (1927),
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not a "formal action before the court." Yet, prior to 1952, plain-
tiff's* action would have been "formal" simply because every
time a deposition was taken, interrogatories on facts and articles
propounded, or any of the older and less effective substitutes for
discovery used, it had to be done under a court order, which was
necessarily a "formal action before the court." 20 Thus, though
the courts were ruling that a "step in the prosecution" must be a
"formal action before the court," they were doing so in a context
where the taking of depositions and the use of discovery devices
were of necessity formal action before the court. However, un-
der the Depositions and Discovery Act of 1952,21 borrowed from
federal practice, 22 the trial judge was relieved of the burden of
signing these perfunctory orders with the result that the taking
of depositions no longer constituted "formal action before the
court. 12  The pertinent question then becomes, should the courts
utilize the same "formal action" test in a context where the tak-
ing of depositions and the use of discovery devices no longer
require formal action by the court?
DeClouet gives an affirmative answer. Judge Culpepper,
writing the majority opinion, notes that legislative intent in
enacting article 3519 was that suits, once filed, should not be
allowed to linger indefinitely and thereby preserve stale claims
from the normal operation of prescription. He further notes
that judicial interpretation has called for a formal action in the
judicial proceedings themselves to interrupt the running of the
five-year period during which action is required. 24 Such rea-
soning overlooks the fact that the legislative intent spoken of
and the judicial interpretation of article 3519 arose in a period
when discovery procedures required formal action before the
court. Thus, the procedural changes affecting discovery are
ignored. It might just as logically have been argued that the
judicial test of formal action arose because the courts were
aware that discovery devices did require formal action of the
20. La. Code of Practice arts. 140, 175, 426, 430, 439 (1870). See also LA.
R.S. 13:3771-3778 (1950), repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 32.
21. La. Acts 1952, No. 202.
22. Hubert, The New Louisiana Statute on Depositions and Discovery, 13
LA. L. REv. 173, 175 (1953).
23. See former LA. R.S. 13:3752(A), 13:3781, 13:3784. Adopted in 1952, this
approach and these provisions were repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, but re-
tained in the new procedural Code, LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1451,
4191, 1496 (1960).
24. 176 So. 2d 471, 473 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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court at that time. That is, one could reason: the legislature
enacted article 3519 in order that suits should not be allowed to
linger indefinitely; the judiciary, aware of legislative intent
and aware that discovery devices required formal action, inter-
preted article 3519 as requiring formal action before the court.
The latter reasoning has the added advantage of crediting the
judiciary with some understanding of what would be included
under a "formal action before the court" criterion applied to
article 3519.
In squarely facing the question whether the taking of depo-
sitions and the use of discovery devices should be considered
"steps in the prosecution or defense" under article 561, the basic
consideration for abandoning the "formal action" test should be
examined. The rationale in requiring a "step in the prosecu-
tion or defense" to be a "formal action before the court" was
that if actual steps before the court were required then any
uncertainty as to whether the other party had abandoned the
suit would be eliminated.2 5 Under the present procedural rules,
however, there is little danger of uncertainty. The Code of Civil
Procedure, article 1421, provides that if depositions are to be
taken the parties must, first, agree to it in writing and, second,
give formal notice of the time and place of the taking to the
other party.26 Thus, insofar as depositions are concerned, the
uncertainty rationale would seem to fall and, along with it, the
"formal action" test of abandonment. Judges Tate and Fruge
make this point in their dissents. 27
That the "formal action" test should be retained for all but
discovery procedures was proposed to the Louisiana State Law
Institute. In drawing up the Depositions and Discovery Act of
1952, the Institute did not envision that discovery devices would
no longer suffice to interrupt the period for abandonment. The
proposed amendment to article 561 was designed to legislatively
overrule DeClouet and at the same time to retain the "formal
action" test by incorporating the "formal action" test into the
article. Thus, any formal action before the court in the prosecu-
tion or defense would have interrupted the abandonment period.
25. Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280 (1941); Sanders v. Luke,
92 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); State ex rel. Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v.
Edrington, 11 Orl. App. 288 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1914).
26. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, art. 1421 (1960).
27. 176 So. 2d 471, 474, 475 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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However, it would also have amended the article to provide that
the taking of any depositions or the use of any other discovery
devices (if done according to statutory directives) would con-
stitute "steps in the prosecution or defense" sufficient to inter-
rupt the five-year abandonment period. 28
It should, perhaps, be noted that one might justifiably argue
for a reduction of the period necessary to constitute abandon-
ment. Under article 561 an action is not abandoned unless five
years have elapsed without any steps having been taken by any
of the parties.29 Such a lengthy period has frequently been used
by plaintiff attorneys in an effort to force settlement in cases
they recognize to be weak which they are not anxious to prose-
cute. Further, there is no denying that the five-year period
places a heavy burden on the already overcrowded civil dockets.
On the other hand, one must balance the time-consuming diffi-
culties in obtaining depositions and discovery information often
experienced in this complex day and age. A shorter period with
liberal provisions for extension would seem more appropriate.
Perhaps attention should be given to the rule of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana un-
der which the clerk calls all actions pending and undisposed of
in which no steps in the prosecution have been taken within six
months. 30 If combined with liberal provisions for extension, this
rule would seem to thwart the protracted threat of prosecution
as well as alleviate the problem of a crowded docket, yet it would
28. The following amendment of the first paragraph of article 561 was recom-
mended by the Reporters on the Code of Civil Procedure projet: "An action is
abandoned when the parties fail to take any action, consisting of a formal move
in the trial court to further its prosecution or defense, the taking of a deposition,
or the use of any of the discovery devices, for a period of five years. This pro-
vision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte motion of any
party or other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal order of
dismissal as of the date of its abandonment."
The Reporters' Advisory Committee approved the proposed legislative reversal
of the DeClouet case but, fearing that the proposed amendment would unduly
lengthen the period for abandonment, qualified its approval by a recommendation
that the five-year period be shortened to three years. The Council of the Law
Institute expressed the view that, even under the DeClouet decision, the present
period was ample and decided not to recommend any amendment of the first
paragraph of article 561.
The Council did recommend an amendment of the second paragraph of this
article, but only to grant plenary power to the appellate courts to determine the
period for abandonment on appeal, to avoid conflict with the appellate courts'
rules. Cf. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA rule VII, § 3 (1962).
29. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 561 (1960), quoted in note 4 supra.
30. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF Louisi-
ANA, GENERAL, CIVIL, AND ADMIRALTY RULES, rule 12 (1944, as amended, 1965)
LOUISIANA COURT RULES 229, 237 (1965).
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assure counsel ample time to discover whatever information he
might need to effectively prosecute his case.8 1
Richard A. Tonry
INSURANCE -RESIDENT OF THE SAME HOUSEHOLD
Upon graduation from high school in Arkansas, Daniel Tay-
lor, an unemancipated minor, left the home of his parents and
went to live with his uncle in Louisiana, where he accepted a job
with his uncle's employer. On the morning of the accident,
Daniel and his uncle were on their way to their place of employ-
ment; Daniel was driving his uncle's pickup truck with his con-
sent. Daniel lost control of the vehicle, which overturned, re-
sulting in serious injuries to his uncle. The uncle sued his own
liability insurer and the liability insurer of the father. The trial
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff against both insurers. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari but limited its consideration to the question
of whether Daniel Taylor was a resident of his father's house-
hold at the time of the accident. Held, Daniel Taylor was a resi-
dent of his father's household at the time of the accident, thereby
rendering his father's insurer liable under its family automobile
liability policy.' Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248
La. 246, 178 So. 2d 238 (1965).
31. Moreover, it would seem wise to demand consistency between the periods
within which a case will be considered abandoned on the trial level (presently
five years), on appeal to an appellate court (presently five years), and on appeal
to the Supreme Court (recently revised from five years to one year by the
Supreme Court in RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA rule VII, § 3
(1962) ; LOUISIANA COURT RULES 7, 13 (1965).
In order therefore to effect consistency throughout the judicial system, and
because five years does seem unduly long, it is suggested the last paragraph of
article 561 should be amended to allow the appellate court to provide by rule for
the dismissal of appeals for the failure to take any steps in the prosecution or
defense for a lesser period than five years. Such a revision is presently being
considered by the Louisiana State Law Institute.
1. The pertinent parts of the insurance policy are as follows:
"Named Insured-means the individual so designated in the declarations
[Garnie Taylor] and also includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household.
"In8ured-the word 'insured' includes (1) the named insured, and also in-
cludes (2) his relatives, (3) any other person while using the automobile, pro-
vided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named in-
sured ....
"Relative--means a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the
same household.
"INSURING AGREEMENT II-NoN-OwNED AUTOMOBILES. Such insurance . . .
applies to the use of a non-owned automobile by the named insured or a rela-
tive .... "
